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Introduction 
Disputes involving the sorts of things that are claimed to be the cultural stuff of one community 
or another mark and tarnish the recorded history of humanity.  Then, as now, it is clear that 
these disputes were primarily generated by the unattractive human propensity to plunder, loot, 
steal, pillage, (mis)appropriate and destroy. Under these circumstances, there is a certain 
inevitability in the fact that cultural heritage first became a recognised concept in modern 
international law at the time of the Vienna Treaty of 1815,1 which was imposed by the British 
victors after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. The precise motivations for the British 
insistence that France atone for the destruction of heritage and return the movable artefacts 
looted by Napoleon during his campaigns might be reasonably be regarded as being obscured 
by the passage of time. However, given the context, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
relevant clause was punitive. More interesting for present purposes is the likelihood that it was 
influenced by the concurrent rise of a discourse that linked people, territory and cultural 
objects.2  That this was an entirely Eurocentric and imperial discourse is hardly a great surprise: 
at the same time as Britain was championing the return of European cultural artefacts3 it 
continued to plunder the cultural artefacts of its colonies with impunity.4  By the end of the 
Second World War, however, this colonial free-for-all was coming to an end.  Britain had been 
replaced by America as the dominant world power, the regimes of international law were being 
remade, and the period of decolonization was commencing.5  Even though the current 
international law regime for the protection of cultural heritage was born out of the rupture that 
marked the end of the British period of world dominance and inaugurated the American one, it 
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 A F Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums & the Return of Cultural Objects (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at 23-29. 
2
 Vrdoljak 2008, ibid., Pt 1. 
3 Even if the championing tended to be more rhetorical than anything else: see F Macmillan, ‘The Protection of 
Cultural Heritage: Common Heritage of Humankind, National Cultural “Patrimony” or Private Property?’ 
(2013) 64 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 351 at 356-357. 
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is nevertheless marked by both its historical antecedents6 and by contemporaneous movements 
in the geo-political order. 
Of these contemporaneous geo-political movements, two are particularly important to the 
argument in this article. First of all, there is the very process of decolonization itself and the 
political aspirations that accompanied it. At the international law level, this process was 
managed in a rather ex post facto fashion by something that eventually became the Vienna 
Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts of 
1983.  In the current context there are two key (low) points of this treaty.  The first of these is 
its failure to recognise the distinctive position of Indigenous peoples within former colonial 
subject states.  This, of course, is a serious problem with which the international law system 
continues to struggle.  In part, it is a consequence of the strongly state-based thinking that 
characterized the development of international law in the post-war period.  This explanation 
(the inadequacy and injustice of which needs no elaboration), however, cannot serve to explain 
the second important aspect of the Vienna Convention, which is the absence of any rules on 
restitution of works of art or artefacts to the former colonial states.  Instead, the question of the 
return of works of art and artefacts was to be governed by bilateral negotiations under the 
auspices of a UNESCO Committee, the operation of which has continued up until to the present 
period.7  As this article will argue, a significant part of the current political concern with the 
question of the protection of cultural artefacts is a consequence of the failure of international 
law properly to address the wrongs of the colonial period.8 
The second important political current in the post-colonial period was the re-institutionalisation 
of the concept of free trade along with the remaking of the international law regime after the 
Second World War. The concept of international free trade had been floating around in 
international law since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1649.9  While the economic freedoms of 
Westphalia were not observed during the Napoleonic Wars, they were restored in the 
Settlement of Vienna of 1815 and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818.10 And then these 
freedoms were restored again, after the cataclysms of the First and Second World Wars, at 
Bretton Woods, starting the international legal system(s) on a process that lead eventually to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).11  The strength of this discourse, and the political and 
economic baggage that it has dragged in its wake, has had a particular effect on the way in 
which the relationship between public, community and private rights has played out in relation 
to cultural artefacts.  This is the case with respect to both tangible and intangible artefacts, 
although there seems little doubt that the conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs Agreement) as one of the WTO covered agreements 
has considerably upped the ante in this respect in relation to intangible cultural stuff. 
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At the same time as all this was going on, the post Second World War period has also seen the 
emergence of what Laurajane Smith describes as the authorized heritage discourse.12  Thanks 
to both its historical antecedents13 and its geo-political context the authorised heritage discourse 
provided a pretty clear idea of what cultural heritage was considered to be.  Based on Cartesian 
dualisms14 of nature and culture, tangible and intangible, there was a reasonable sense of 
certainty in the world of international policy and law-making about the objects of the various 
efforts at protection.  Of course, imbricated in that certainty were particular ideas of nation, 
class and ethnicity.15  But this could hardly be regarded as a surprise for a concept that was 
cooked up in the West and embedded in the post-World War Two regime of international 
policymaking and heritage law, represented by bodies like ICOMOS and UNESCO.16  Under 
this regime, and reflecting its Western philosophical roots, the authorized heritage discourse, 
took on the characteristics of what must have seemed like the only comparable Western legal 
concept.  Consequently, the international legal regime for the protection of cultural heritage 
came to reflect occidental property law distinctions.17  One of these is the distinction between 
things that are said, by law, to be “fixed” to a particular place and those that are said to be 
moveable.  Another, of course, is the distinction between tangible and intangible things. 
One consequence of a legal and conceptual order that distinguishes cultural stuff on these bases 
is that, lacking much in the way of an overarching definition of cultural heritage, there appears 
to be no common conceptual basis for the protection, including the protection from destruction, 
of all these different types of things.  In fact, the standard discourse around the destruction of 
cultural heritage is largely confined to a concern about the physical destruction of monumental, 
and thus immoveable, objects and is almost exclusively about tangible things.  Because 
conceiving of cultural heritage as being mainly tangible and monumental has a strongly 
Western flavour this also means that this discourse is imbricated with an “us and them”, West 
and the rest, flavour.  In the current geo-political situation, understanding the destruction of 
cultural heritage in these terms focuses upon motivations for destruction that are broadly 
political and/or indicate the absence of acceptable (Western) values.  In this article, I argue that 
the notion of the destruction of cultural heritage should, rather, be focussed on situations where 
the inherent nature of something as heritage is destroyed. Such a concept might very well 
include the dynamiting of ancient sites, but my argument is that it is much broader.  In order to 
sustain this argument, the next part of the article reflects on the inherent nature of heritage, 
movable and immovable, tangible and intangible.  The article then moves on to suggest an 
alternative vision of the destruction of cultural heritage that is rooted, not in some epochal clash 
between the West and the rest, but rather in the geo-political movements and legal ordering 
that have emerged in the post-colonial period. 
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 Between Movement, Monumentality and Materiality 
Given the great variety of cultural artefacts that now, thanks to the UNESCO regime, are 
included within the concept of heritage, perhaps it is no surprise to find that the authorised 
heritage discourse does not seem to contain an overarching idea of heritage that holds together 
all its disparate strands.  The distinctions between moveable and immoveable, and between 
tangible and intangible, tend to have obscured the development of a uniting concept.  This is 
not only the inevitable result of the theoretical process of division and compartmentalisation 
but also a consequence of the way in which the authorised heritage discourse has ignored the 
artificiality, and even meaninglessness, of these distinctions.  The history of the looting, 
sacking and removal of cultural objects makes it abundantly clear that plenty of things that law 
regards as immoveable are, in fact, quite evidently moveable.18  If the failure of the authorised 
heritage discourse to appreciate this point seems troubling, then we need to find a much 
stronger adjective to describe its complete confusion around questions of tangibility and 
materiality.  Until the twenty first century, the distinction between tangible and intangible 
heritage appears to have given very little trouble to the authorized heritage discourse as 
embodied in the ICOMOS-UNESCO regime.  Its overwhelming focus on tangible stuff, fixed 
or moveable, denominated as heritage by reference to a set of intangible values, provided a 
neat way of dealing with the tangible/intangible distinction, without losing the similarly 
overwhelming occidental focus on the tangible heritage object.  This is well demonstrated by 
both the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, dealing with moveables, and 
the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
(the World Heritage Convention, as it is popularly known), dealing with legally denominated 
immoveables. 
The World Heritage Convention, for example, limits its concept of protected tangibles by 
reference to obviously occidental concepts such as “outstanding universal value from the point 
of view of history, art or science” and “outstanding universal value from the historical, 
aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view”19  According to both Conventions, 
which dominated the international legal protection of heritage in the twentieth century, heritage 
was what the state said it was, or in the case of the World Heritage Convention, what the state 
said it was as endorsed by a UNESCO listing.20  And what the state said was heritage was 
governed by prevailing national discourses that tended, and still tend, to privilege the largely 
Western ideas that dominant elites have about things that are important to history, art, literature, 
science, anthropology and ethnology.21  The possibility that the intangible could take flight on 
its own account and start to fray this straitjacket may have been raised from time to time in 
international contexts – and especially by subaltern voices22 – but for a considerable period it 
was in little danger of toppling the operation of the authorized heritage discourse.  The process 
                                                          
18 If an example of this is needed, the so-called “Elgin Marbles”, previously part of various buildings on the 
Athenian Acropolis would fit nicely, as would the Bruno Schulz wall paintings that have been relocated from 
Drohobych in the Ukraine to the Yad Vashem Museum in Jerusalem. 
19 World Heritage Convention 1972, Art 1. 
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of Cultural Property 1970, Art 1, which protects “cultural property” falling within a closed list of categories all 
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1972, Art 11. 
21 See, eg, Smith 2006, n 12 above; & Harrison 2013, n 14 above. 
22 Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 106-113. 
leading to the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage and the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions started chipping away at all this certainty.  Now that both these 
Conventions have come into force it seems that the limits on the possible expansion of the 
heritage concept that were imposed by the linkage between the tangible and the intangible have 
been abandoned. 
This, of course, has created some problems in defining the concept of intangible cultural 
heritage.  Strangely, however, the question of what is intangible seems comparatively less 
problematic than the question of what we mean by heritage.  Perhaps the long occidental 
obsession with the tangible/intangible distinction turns out to be some help after all.  This is 
because, as much as it is true that all tangible heritage is inherently connected with the 
intangible values that make it heritage and not just a pile of old junk, is also arguably the case 
that all – or nearly all - intangible heritage is connected to the tangible or material world.  The 
type of intangible practices that likely constitute intangible cultural heritage are, as Harrison 
argues, “thoroughly embedded in a set of physical relationships with objects, places and other 
people”.23  (While forms of cultural heritage that are digital may present some challenges to 
this characterization, an intangible place - like cyberspace – might nevertheless count as a 
place.) 
So what then do we mean when we talk about (cultural) heritage?24  Here I want to leave aside 
the long lists of stuff that UNESCO and the authorised heritage discourse says are cultural 
heritage and, instead, look for some overarching concept that might hold all those disparate 
things together.  In searching for this concept in the contemporary context it may be helpful to 
recognise that the idea of heritage, as it is usually employed in current political and cultural 
contexts, involves a type of pas de deux between past and present, which is reflected in 
modernity’s relationship with time.  As Harrison writes of modernity: 
[I]t constantly creates the present as “contemporary past” whilst it anticipates the future 
as embodied within its present.  In other words, modernity creates for itself a past that 
is perceived to be both immanent (contained within) and imminent (impending) in the 
present … One important outcome of this rather peculiar relationship with time is that 
in its obsessive attempts to transcend the present, modernity becomes fixated on the 
past in several distinctive ways.  In the first instance, it is haunted by the idea of decline 
or decay … Secondly, in attempting to define itself in opposition to tradition and the 
past, modernity becomes concerned with defining and categorising it.25 
The critical point is that this pas de deux between past and present is immanent in the very 
notion of heritage, which is always contemporary and also always past.  It is always 
contemporary because it is only in the present that it is recognised as heritage, but also always 
past because it has to have already happened, even if it has only just happened, for us to be able 
to reflect on it and identify it as heritage.26  This element of reflection is essential to the concept 
of heritage, which is constituted by those things we select from the past (including the near 
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24 I am stuck here between my sympathy for the tendency of heritage studies scholars to omit “cultural” and my 
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25 Harrison 2013, n 14 above, at 25-26 (references omitted). 
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past) as having the sort of value that makes them worth passing on to the future.27  There is, of 
course, an obvious political element in identifying what is considered to be worth handing on 
to the future28 and this carries with it a degree of malleability and slipperiness. Thus, what we 
understand to be cultural heritage reflects current political concerns.  One result is that the idea 
of heritage has become a rhetorical moving feast that enjoys potency in cultural and political 
discourse, and which is capable of both affirming or opposing its own authorized discourse.  
As Smith argues: 
Heritage is dissonant – it is a constitutive social process that on the one hand is about 
regulating and legitimizing, and on the other hand is about working out, contesting and 
challenging a range of cultural and social identities, sense of place, collective memories, 
values and meanings that prevail in the present and can be passed on to the future”.29 
The questions of whose identity prevails, whose collective memories survive and who gets to 
decide what is passed on to the future are all intensely political questions “tied to claims to and 
expressions of power”30 by a community.  And it is in this mutually constitutive relationship 
between heritage and community that the particular power and importance of heritage lies.  Not 
only does cultural heritage belong to communities, but it also defines them and confers them 
with cultural, social and political power.31 
This mutual relationship between heritage and community tends to reinforce the essentially 
intangible nature of all heritage.32  It also means that some understanding of the nature and 
identity of community is an essential part of any attempt to conceptualise cultural heritage.  At 
the same time, it is precisely at the interface of cultural heritage and community that a particular 
challenge is flaunted in the face of the authorized heritage discourse as it is contained in the 
international legal instruments.  This is because the authorized heritage discourse understands 
the cultural heritage community as being national.  In order to suppress dissonance, it often 
ignores the fact that community identities are formed at multiple levels and in multiple layers.33  
It necessarily ignores the fact that one of the more contentious levels of community identity 
may be that of the nation. 
The assimilation of the idea of community into that of nation is the target of Anderson’s famous 
critique of nationalism.34  Anderson proposes that the central foundational concepts around 
which community rotates are identification and memory, which are reflexively linked to one 
another.  For Anderson, communities are always imagined.35  By this he means not that they 
are fake or false, but rather that they are created by the imagination, that is by being imagined.  
Accordingly, he observes that “[c]ommunities are to be distinguished not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined”.36  These observations do 
much to enrich the foundational relation of identification and memory.  There are three, in 
                                                          
27 See also, Blake 2000, n 10 supra, 68-69; F Macmillan, “Arts Festivals as Cultural Heritage in a Copyright 
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29 Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 82. 
30 Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 192. 
31 See Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 288. 
32 See also Smith 2006, n 12 above, at eg 3 & 307. 
33 See also Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 53. 
34 B Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London & New 
York: Verso, 2006, first published 1983). 
35 With the possible exception of “primordial villages of face-to-face contact”: Anderson 2006, n 34 above, at 6. 
36 Anderson 2006, n 34 above, at 6. 
particular, that go to the heart of how community is imagined.  First, Anderson notes the “deep 
horizontal comradeship”37 that characterizes the imagined community – something that might 
also be referred to as solidarity.  Secondly, he places emphasis on the temporal aspect of 
community, “this sense of parallelism or simultaneity”.38  The temporal dimensions here are 
both horizontal and vertical.  They are horizontal because comradeship and solidarity carry 
with them some notion of a shared temporal space.  And they are vertical because if memory 
is critical to the imagined community then this implies a shared concept of the community’s 
history and its temporal progression.  Following on from this, the third aspect of Anderson’s 
study that has particular resonance is exactly this question of how a community imagines its 
relationship with its own past.  Thus we arrive at the critical question of the reflexive 
relationship between community and memory.  The process of remembering and forgetting 
things is the way in which the heritage community forms its identity, selecting those things 
from the past – including the very recent past – that it wants to celebrate and pass on to the 
future.  This process of remembering and forgetting lies at the heart of the discourse of the 
imagined community39  and, at the same time, it is the key to identifying that community’s 
cultural heritage.  Accordingly, as Smith argues, heritage is best understood as “a constitutive 
cultural process that identifies those things and places that can be given meaning and value as 
‘heritage’ reflecting contemporary cultural and social values, debates and aspirations”.40 
As all this suggests, the concept of community that is in play here is a subjective one.  
Accepting that communities can be formed by less than the public at large in any given nation-
state, the question of their subjectivity is an important one.  When we talk about the reflexive 
relationship between identification and memory in the context of community formation, whose 
identification are we talking about?  Whose memory?  In particular, if the narrative of 
community built on collective memory is also about forgetting, who is remembering and who 
is forgetting?  It is in relation to questions of this sort that Anderson’s insight that communities 
are imagined is particularly useful.  This is because it is clear from his focus on comradeship-
solidarity, and his focus on common perceptions of time and history, that the communities he 
is talking about are imagined from the inside out rather than the other way around.  This 
suggests, of course, that not only is community a subjective concept, but also that the 
identification of oneself as a member of a community is subjective both for the individual and 
the community.  The complication here is that a community may, and often does, impose 
objective requirements for community membership.  But such requirements cannot work to 
change the essential nature of community formation.  As Christodoulidis argues, community 
comes about “around a political/ethical understanding both capable of upholding a 
commitment, and dynamic, always potentially disruptable internally; and with no measure of 
authority, force, persuasion and violence capable of upholding it externally”.41 
It should be evident from the foregoing that the importance of the concept of community in 
relation to the identification of cultural heritage of all types cannot be overstated.  Community 
and heritage are mutually constitutive.  If heritage belongs to a community, then it is also true 
that a community only exists and identifies itself through a common process of remembering 
and forgetting those things and practices that are essential to its identity.  Cultural heritage, 
therefore, is drawn from a current and ongoing process of selection and identification, which 
                                                          
37 Anderson 2006, n 34 above, at 7; see also Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 303. 
38 Anderson 2006, n 34 above, at 188. 
39 Anderson 2006, n 34 above, ch 11; E Hobsbawm, Fractured Times: Culture and Society in the Twentieth 
Century, (London: Little, Brown, 2013), at 150-151. 
40 Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 3. 
41 E Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics (Dordrecht: Springer, 1998), at 237, citing R Cover, “Nomos 
and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4-68, on the “hermeneutic of principle”. 
reflects contemporary concerns and values.42  And because cultural heritage is reflexive it 
changes with community practice.43  Cultural objects, artefacts and practices that no longer 
reflect the values and practices of a contemporary community are not heritage.  Similarly, 
cultural objects, artefacts and practices that have lost their link to community are no longer 
heritage because their essential quality as heritage has been destroyed.  The next two sections 
of this article examine two processes, both fundamental to Western legal culture, by which the 
link between community and heritage has been destroyed, depriving the cultural objects, 
artefacts and practices in question of their character as heritage, and thus destroying them as 
heritage. 
 
Imperial Destruction 
As was noted at the beginning of this article, history furnishes us with endless examples of the 
physical destruction, looting and appropriation of cultural objects and artefacts.  However, the 
colonial period and its current post-colonial sequel offer a particular perspective from which to 
examine not only the destruction of heritage through the severing of its links with community, 
but also the complicity of law in this process.  That the colonial free-for-all resulted in the 
movement of large amounts of cultural objects and artefacts from the colonial “periphery” to 
the imperial “centres” hardly seems to be a contentious claim.  Not only do we have a 
significant number of celebrated cases where return of such objects has been sought, the scale 
of relocation in the colonial period is evident from a brief walk around the museums and major 
cities of the former imperial centres.  It is frequently the case that the physical integrity of these 
items has been preserved.  Indeed, the “privileging of preservation”44 at the expense of a 
dynamic relationship with identity45 is a Western obsession46 that has often been used to justify 
retaining misappropriated cultural objects and artefacts.  One of the former directors of the 
British Museum, for example, claimed that it was in the best position to conserve the artefacts 
it holds and to present them as part of its “encyclopaedic collection”47  There is a faux naivety 
in this idea: as if this “encyclopaedic collection” could somehow free itself of the circumstances 
in which it was formed, and as though all the components of the collection would be exactly 
the same from wherever they are viewed.  Observations made by Slaughter when addressing 
the concept of “the centre” in the intangible cultural heritage of world literature seem apposite 
here: 
[T]he core defines the norms and forms that make it the core; it defines itself as center 
… We should remember, here at the center, that the core is the core not because it is 
the source of things, but because it is a collection of things … [T]he center absorbs 
                                                          
42 Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 3; see also Harrison 2013, n 14 above, at 14, quoted in n 26 above. 
43 P Fitzpatrick P.& R Joyce, “Copying Right: Cultural Property and the Limits of (Occidental) Law” in F. 
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Cultural Property 307, esp at 311. 
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 N MacGregor, “Preface” in K Sloan (ed), Enlightenment: Discovering the World in the Eighteenth Century 
(British Museum Press, 2004), at 6.  See also, N MacGregor, “To Shape the Citizens of ‘that great city, the 
world’” in J Cuno (ed), Whose Culture? The Promise of Museums & the Debate over Antiquities (Princeton 
University Press, 2009), at 39-54. 
everything; it … treats everywhere else and everything else as raw materials to be 
extracted, exploited, accumulated, and privatized …[T]he center is never simply a 
given or merely an object; it is the effect of a certain way of seeing and speaking, of 
gathering an analyzing data.48 
Despite attempts by many museums and collections to present objects in a way that is in 
sympathy with the object’s cultural origins and history, the symbolic significance of an article 
that has been decontextualized and severed from its community is always changed. 
Understanding the complicity of law in this state of affairs requires an engagement not only 
with the specific international regime for the protection of cultural heritage, but also with the 
shape of international law more generally in the post-colonial period.  At this most general 
level we are faced with two problems.  The first is that the post Second World War international 
law system was made by the former imperial powers.  This may well be regarded as explaining, 
for example, why the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts of 1983 contains no rules on the restitution of works of art or 
artefacts to the former colonial states.  But at least these states are recognised as actors in 
international law.  The less good news is that since some of them are artificial constructs of the 
post-colonial period they do not necessarily reflect the structure of the pre-colonial 
communities, the heritage of which was freely appropriately in the colonial period.  This 
observation is linked to the second general problem that the international law system presents 
with respect to the protection of cultural heritage.  This problem is the failure of international 
law to recognise any concept of community other than that represented by the nation state. 
While the exact nature of the relationship between the nation state and the constitution of 
international law is a matter of debate,49 there is little real hope of escaping from the conclusion 
that the juridical actors of international law are the states themselves and the supranational, 
international and intergovernmental organisations created through the mutually interdependent 
process of international law-making.  Communities, despite being recognised in political 
theory as constituting the common political identity that forms the basis of the nation, and 
perhaps also the common cultural identity that precedes a common political identity, have 
traditionally received little formal attention in international law precisely because their identity 
has been submerged into that of the nation-state.  This concept of international law and of 
international law-making is clearly exclusionary.  One of its consequences is that in the post-
colonial context Indigenous Peoples, not constituting a state in international law, have found 
themselves without a voice at the international law-making table.  In the specific context of the 
protection of cultural heritage this also means that the concept of a community, which I have 
argued is a critical counterpart to that of cultural heritage, can mostly only be understood in the 
relevant international law instruments as being a nation state.  In other words, in most of these 
instruments, the concept of community – if it exists at all – must be considered to be co-
extensive with the nation state.  It is true that more recent conventions, notably the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and the 2003 
Convention for the Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage appear recognise the critical 
connection between cultural heritage and community, where community is understood as 
something different from the nation state.  However, neither of these conventions give us much 
                                                          
48
 J R Slaughter, “Form & Informality: An Unliterary Look at World Literature” in R. Warhol (ed), The Work of 
Genre: Selected Essays from the English Institute, (New York: English Institute in Collaboration with the 
American Council of Learned Societies, 2011), at 196. 
49 Cf A Carty, “Myths of international legal order: Past and present”, (1997) 10 Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 3-22 & P Fitzpatrick, “‘The new constitutionalism’: The global, the postcolonial and the 
constitution of nations” (2006) 10(2) Law, Democracy and Development 1-20. 
to go by in trying to identify such a community.50  Even more importantly, the ability of 
communities that are not nation states to vindicate rights to their cultural heritage using these 
conventions is extremely limited. 
So far as the specifics of the international legal regime for the protection of cultural heritage 
are concerned, the story only gets worse.  This is mainly because of the non-retroactive effect 
of the conventions, which means that they do not apply to items moved during the colonial 
period.  The irony of this is particularly marked in relation to the Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property, Article 2 of which provides: 
The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit import, export and 
transfer of cultural property is one of the main causes of the impoverishment of the 
cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such property and that international co-
operation constitutes one of the most efficient means of protecting each country’s 
cultural property against all the dangers resulting there from. 
 
The fact that the Convention, and its more recent partner the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen 
or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 1995,51 apply to moveable tangible artefacts and that 
both Conventions clearly envisage that such artefacts are national in nature would seem to give 
them a role here.  However, these Conventions only apply to activities undertaken from the 
time they came into force,52 which means are they are more or less irrelevant, in a strictly legal 
sense, to the claims of post-colonial states for the restitution of objects removed during the 
colonial period.  On the other hand, symbolically they might be regarded as stating an ethical 
position that should be recognised by the international community,53 but is not.  
Then, of course, there is also the problem that non-state community claims to cultural heritage 
are mostly ignored in the conventions.  Representing some changes in political awareness, the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention recognises the existence of “national, tribal, indigenous or other 
communities” and introduces some procedural rules about claims in the light of this.  Its 
applicability is, of course, limited by the problem of retrospectivity.  However, given that 
Indigenous peoples lack the protection of statehood and are still at the whim of the nation states 
in which they live, the Convention might be regarded as having slightly more utility in a 
temporal sense because their cultural property is still at considerable risk of misappropriation.  
Running counter to this suggestion are the facts that: first, the Convention envisages the need 
for a co-operative relationship between these groups and the state or states in which they live 
in relation to the international claims for return with which it is concerned; and, secondly, the 
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fact that it only deals with international claims means that it says nothing about claims by 
Indigenous Peoples against the states in which they live. 
 
Overall, the international legal regime appears to have been constructed in order to avoid the 
obligation to return objects and artefacts misappropriated in the colonial period to the 
communities whose symbolic connection to those objects and artefacts has made them into 
cultural heritage in the first place.  Of course, over time such artefacts and objects can acquire 
symbolic significance as cultural heritage to different communities.  The famous horses of 
Piazza San Marco, one of the symbols of Venice, were looted by Napoleon and subsequently 
returned to Venice under terms imposed for the return of looted heritage by the Vienna Treaty 
of 1815.  No-one much mentions, then or now, that the Venetians had looted them from Corinth 
several centuries earlier.  The reason for this must be that after spending a few centuries in 
Venice they acquired a second, but not necessarily secondary, significance as Venetian cultural 
heritage.  Applying the same sort of reasoning, perhaps objects looted in the colonial period, 
which in many cases have spent well over a human lifetime in the display cases of the former 
imperial powers, have also become part of the cultural heritage of those former imperial 
powers.  Similarly, the confused symbolic claims of colonial settler states, such as Australia,54 
to the cultural property of its (pre-existing) Indigenous Peoples, might be read as a claim to 
some sort of jointly held cultural heritage.  Perhaps, however, one of the things that makes 
these cases different to the horses of Piazza San Marco is the very existence of current 
competing claims, which make a compelling case for the vindication of a connection between 
the object in question and an existing community.  The denial of these claims is a form of 
destruction of cultural heritage by a refusal to remedy the severing of the link between 
community and heritage. 
 
Destruction by Commodification 
The failure of the international law governing cultural heritage to address the severing of the 
link between artefacts and community in relation to tangibles misappropriated during the 
colonial period might be understood as a sort of failure by omission.  That is, it might be 
understood as a failure to correct an existing wrong.  In some senses we could say that the 
system has refused to engage with the assertion to some type of property rights, created at the 
time of their misappropriation, over those tangibles.  Such a failure to engage is a failure after 
the event.  That is, it is a failure to remedy a historic wrong.  When, however, we turn to the 
question of the failure of international heritage law to prevent the severing of the link between 
intangibles and community, achieved through the process of commodification of those 
intangibles, we are faced with a more complicated legal landscape.  Part of this complication, 
of course, arises from the questionable distinction between intangible and tangible heritage.55  
Certainly, we could find plenty of examples where the misappropriation of tangible heritage 
also implicated the misappropriation of intangible heritage.  And, it is also clearly the case, that 
the sort of things that the international legal regime now describes as intangible heritage were 
subject to much misappropriation in the period prior to their recognition by this regime.  All 
this means that, again, the regime sins by omission, that is, by its failure to redress historic 
wrongs.  However, the question of the commodification of intangibles also raises issues about 
the current relationship between heritage law and intellectual property law.  This means that 
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the destruction of cultural heritage by commodification raises wider systemic issues because it 
involves a clash between currently existing legal concepts.  This is a clash that the law refuses 
to see. 
According to Article 2.1 of the 2003 Convention for the Protection of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage (ICH Convention), “intangible cultural heritage” means: 
the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the 
instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that 
communities, groups and in some cases, individuals recognise as part of their cultural 
heritage.  This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, 
is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, 
their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity 
and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. 
The Convention does not seek to define the concept of community.  Nor does it attempt to 
indicate expressly how a community might be recognised by the law, although perhaps the 
reflexive relationship between community, types of intangible things (“practices, 
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills”) and a tangible or spatial dimension 
(“instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces”) in this definition provide some 
orientation points.56  It is clear that what constitutes “practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated 
therewith” in Article 2.1. of the ICH Convention must be understood to be in a reflexive 
relationship with the community to which they belong.  The risk that we start to enter into an 
endless circularity of vague uncertainty is mitigated to some extent by Article 2.2 in which 
specific instances of the sort of stuff that falls within the general definition in Article 2.1 is 
listed inclusively as follows: 
(a) oral traditions and expressions, including language as the vehicle of the 
intangible cultural heritage; 
(b) performing arts; 
(c) social practices, rituals and festive events; 
(d) knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe; 
(e) traditional craftsmanship. 
Armed with this guidance on the type of stuff that constitutes intangible cultural heritage, and 
tactfully avoiding the problem of community identification, we might say that the ICH 
Convention makes quite a reasonable job of identifying the sorts of intangible things that might 
be the reasonable object of protection as forms of heritage.  This even extends to its 
acknowledgement of the role of the tangible and spatial dimensions of this type of heritage.57 
Or, at least, things seem this way until one turns from the gilded cage of the ICH Convention’s 
text to its real operative life.  At this point, things start to look a bit less rosy for three reasons 
in particular, all of which are part and parcel of the essentially state-based nature and occidental 
framing of (not only) this Convention (but also all international law).  First, the patterns of state 
adherence to the ICH Convention may reasonably be interpreted as expressing the continuing 
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unease that the authorised heritage discourse has with the concept of intangible cultural 
heritage.58  At the time of writing the ICH Convention has 175 states parties,59 which is a good 
overall level of adherence.  There is a significant level of adherence amongst non-Western 
states.  However, there are some interesting omissions amongst the parties to the Convention, 
especially if it is compared with other UNESCO conventions pertaining to cultural heritage.  
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom, for example, are 
not parties to the ICH Convention.  Smith notes that for countries such as these, in addition, to 
unease with the idea of intangible cultural heritage, there is also doubt about its relevance: “one 
official in a leading government heritage organization in the United Kingdom having asserted 
the irrelevance of the Convention as the ‘UK has no intangible heritage’”.60  But even for those 
occidental states that are parties, it is evident that very little (comparatively speaking) has been 
listed.  Non-Western states have made an overwhelmingly greater use of the provisions to list 
intangible cultural heritage on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 
Humanity and the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding, which 
are established under articles 16 and 17, respectively, of the ICH Convention.  A comparison 
with the use made by Western states of the listing facility under the World Heritage 
Convention, which has been extensive, points up a notable lack of Western interest in 
intangible cultural heritage even on the part of signatory states to the ICH Convention.  This 
phenomenon Smith suggests “relates to the inability of intangible heritage to ‘speak to’ or find 
synergy with the dominant sense of historical and social experiences” on which the (Western) 
authorized heritage discourse is based.61 
Despite the not unpromising text of the ICH Convention, the reality of its operation suggests 
substantial flaws in its ability to protect intangible cultural heritage, and this is particularly the 
case in relation to the sort of intangible heritage that might be described as involving 
contemporary cultural practices.  The more contemporary the practice, the more mutable it is; 
and the more fluid (or unstable) the community built around it, the less likely it is, in any case, 
to find its way to a listing under the ICH Convention.  Added to this, occidental discourses of 
heritage, which mostly seem to understand intangible heritage as something that “they” (non-
Western states) have,62 and the state-centric nature of both the ICH Convention and its listing 
process all militate against such recognition.  Does this really matter at all?  Do vibrant vital 
cultural practices need the protection of law?  What could law possibly offer that is of use to 
them?  It seems hardly worth lingering over the safeguarding obligations on states with respect 
to listed intangible cultural heritage that are contained in the ICH Convention.  These 
obligations, according to Article 2.3 require states to put in place “measures aimed at ensuring 
the viability of the intangible cultural heritage, including the identification, documentation, 
research, preservation, protection, promotion, enhancement, transmission … as well as the 
revitalization of the various aspects of such heritage”.  The very nature of these obligations 
tends to emphasize the folkloric and static nature of the things that are likely to be listed, and 
perhaps also their value in attracting tourism.  My suggestion is that the form of legal protection 
that might conceivably matter for intangible cultural heritage, particularly in relation to some 
types of contemporary cultural practices, is one that is notably absent from the ICH 
Convention: protection from the exercise of private intellectual property rights over cultural 
production. 
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It is clear from the definition of intangible cultural heritage in the ICH Convention, and 
especially Article 2.2 listing instances of the sort of stuff that falls within the general definition 
in Article 2.1, that it embraces aspects of contemporary creative arts.  In fact, the list in Article 
2.2 immediately suggests some sort of relationship between intangible cultural heritage and, at 
least, copyright law.  But even without the aid of this list, it is clear that the association of the 
creative arts with intangible cultural heritage63 necessarily brings it into an engagement with 
copyright.  This is because one of the markers of the social acceptance of a practice as part of 
the creative arts in occidental society seems also to be the fact that the practice then came to be 
protected as a copyright work.64 
The question of the relationship between cultural heritage and intellectual property is a 
particularly fraught one.65  It is clear that part of what might be considered to be intangible 
cultural heritage falls outside the copyright net because, even if its “authors” are identifiable, 
any copyright interest will have disappeared into the mist of the copyright duration rules.  
However, in the context of at least some things that fall within the idea of contemporary cultural 
heritage, the conflict between their identity as intangible cultural heritage and their character 
as a copyright work is alive and well.  The central tension here rests on the fact that while 
cultural heritage is something that “belongs” to a community, intellectual property including 
copyright is a rivalrous form of private property.  The problem is not that the existence of 
private rights necessarily destroys the link between community and the intangible practice in 
question.  The argument here is a more complex one and turns on the fact that the cultural 
heritage system and the intellectual property system have different ways of expressing value.  
And it is the way in which copyright expresses value, especially in the current period, which is 
the key to understanding how it severs intangibles from community, thus destroying their 
character as cultural heritage. 
In the neo-liberal period there is a tendency for everything to be subjected to what has been 
described as “total market thinking”.66  Seeing the world through the spectacles of the neo-
liberal framework leads to the conclusion that value can only be expressed through the market, 
which means that it can only be expressed in the form of a commodity.  When we talk about 
the commodification of artistic works then the relevant instrument of commodification is 
almost always copyright because it is copyright that turns the relevant creative forms into 
private property.  It is, therefore, critically important to distinguish between the fundamentally 
different concepts of not only copyright and cultural heritage, but also of the market and the 
community.  This is because these are the two contexts in which copyright and cultural heritage, 
respectively, express and control the meaning of value. So while copyright as a private property 
right locates all relationships in the context of the market, the context of cultural heritage 
relationships is the community, of which the market forms a part but does not (or should not) 
control the whole. 
In the world of total market thinking formal systems of private property rights such as copyright 
enjoy particular prestige.  The more valuable the right in the marketplace the greater the 
prestige.  In terms of the relationship between intellectual property and cultural heritage, it 
seems clear that cultural property/heritage has suffered from the ensuing prestige deficit, with 
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a consequent impact on the way it is protected under international law.67   The concept of 
cultural heritage, on the other hand, is a way of resisting this reduction of everything to its 
value in the market, a way of resisting the commodification (and creeping propertization) of 
everything.  It proposes an alternative basis for expressing and controlling value according to 
the norms and identity of a community and not according to the market value of private 
property rights.68  None of this is to say that copyright is not valuable to individuals working 
in all areas of creative production to which it applies.  Copyright not only allows individuals to 
gain an economic benefit over their creative labour, it also confers control on them – although 
that control is considerably diminished if copyright does not remain in the hands of the original 
creator.  However, private property rights like copyright are not a route to building a 
community of cultural and creative value.  Such a community needs to be built by a bottom up 
commitment to the value of the artistic or cultural practice.  Within such a community copyright 
will have a value for individual authors, but it is a value that should be limited by the rights 
that other members of the community have in their shared cultural heritage. 
What is particularly important to emphasize here is that the private property relations of 
copyright, which are produced by the law, do not and cannot be regarded as constituting 
community or controlling all aspects of the relationships within it.  As has been argued above, 
community is produced by a reflexive relationship between identity and memory.  It imports, 
however, a concept of solidarity, of mutual obligation.  It is not that property relations cannot 
have a place in community, but rather that they should be subject to the mutual obligations of 
community.  The proper role of the law here is to give community the means to express its 
identity and the collective claims that flow from that identity, having reference always to the 
multiple and overlapping communities that form and give substance to human existence.  
However, the communities that form around and generate many contemporary cultural forms, 
some of which might fall within the definition of contemporary cultural heritage, do not exist 
in a legal environment that looks much like this.  The international intellectual property law 
system, which defines ownership and controls the use of many forms of contemporary cultural 
production identifies value through a system of total market thinking.  Its creation of an 
extensive system of private property rights over cultural products is designed to make those 
products into liquid investments.  The result is that copyright law, the primary function of 
which is to protect investment and the accumulation of capital,69 sustains a system of control 
of cultural output in the hands of a concentrated group of multinational corporate 
agglomerations.70 
There is plenty of evidence that the intellectual property machine has permitted the 
appropriation and commodification by Western corporate interests of the cultural practices and 
knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and communities in the global south.71  But it would be 
misleading to think that the problem here is only a problem of these communities and so another 
manifestation of the conflict between the West and the rest.  All communities generate 
intangible heritage.  This is the case whether UK heritage organization officials think so or 
not.72  The idea that any community does not have intangible heritage probably owes much to 
the fact that we think of intangibles as being the province of private intellectual property rights.  
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In this way, while we may have greatly enriched certain Western-based corporate interests in 
a material sense, we have at the same time degraded our own sense of community in the 
Western world by allowing private intellectual property rights to sever our communities from 
their own cultural practices.  As Slaughter notes: 
[T]he distinction between cultural and intellectual property has generally (once again) 
been mapped onto the divide between the developing and developed world, trailing 
behind it a long series of old familiar orientalist oppositions: individual versus 
collective, personal property vs. group commons, formal versus informal knowledge, 
and so forth. Accordingly, we in the West produce spontaneous original intellectual 
property; they in the rest of the world have a rich (though probably burdensome) 
collective legacy of cultural heritage and traditional knowledge that is, so the logic goes, 
part of what keeps their societies underdeveloped.73 
While the idea that all non-Western cultural property is open to private appropriation is unjust 
and outrageous, it might also be noted that the notion that the West lacks intangible cultural 
property is socially (and culturally) impoverishing.74 
The law itself makes no attempt to understand the relationship between the way meaning and 
value are made in relation to the same cultural practices in the two different systems of 
intangible cultural heritage protection and intellectual property protection.  Consequently, 
unconstrained by any legally imposed attempt at balance or restraint, the transcendence of total 
market thinking in the neo-liberal period has prioritised private property rights and their market 
exploitation over the demands of the contemporary cultural heritage community.75  Current 
practices of cultural production - instead of expressing the identity, solidarity and mutual 
obligations of community - are stymied and constrained by the deadweight of private property 
rights, often exercised not even by other members of the cultural heritage community but by 
the media and entertainment corporations who have commodified so much contemporary 
cultural output.  This form of commodification can, perhaps be usefully contrasted, with other 
forms of commodification or commercialization of cultural heritage.  Heritage is, for example, 
commodified through tourism and I would not be the first to voice the thought that the main 
function, in reality, of the UNESCO lists of tangible and intangible cultural heritage are as 
tourist guides.  But the difference here is that, whatever the regrettable effects of this form of 
commodification,76 at least the fundamental character of the heritage as heritage is retained.  
While it may not always work out this way, the fact that the cultural heritage community may, 
itself, control this process of tourist commodification is important.  In such a case, perhaps we 
can understand the market as being embedded in community (or, at least, not completely 
abandon the hope of this).  But no such assertion can be made when cultural heritage becomes 
private property and its fundamental character as a community artefact is overwhelmed and 
subsumed into the logic of rivalrous individual ownership. 
 
Conclusion: Towards A New Discourse? 
In the end, the argument of this article is a very simple one.  It is that cultural heritage is 
destroyed not just when tangible objects are bombed, dynamited or subjected to some other 
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form of physical degradation, but rather when the link between community and its cultural 
artefacts and practices is severed.  Certainly, physical destruction of an object, moveable or 
immoveable can have this severing effect.  However, this is only one instance of such 
destruction.  There are other ways of severing this link.  In this article I have focussed on two 
such ways.  One is the practice of misappropriation and decontextualization of tangible 
artefacts, and the other is the privatization of intangible practices and artefacts.  I have argued 
that these are largely Western practices, in both a historic and a legal sense.  Of course, 
misappropriation and decontextualization can happen anywhere, but so far as cultural artefacts 
are concerned we are currently living with the legacy of systemic misappropriation and 
decontextualization that occurred in the colonial period.  The international legal regime for the 
protection of cultural heritage, which is rather suspect in any case for its general inability to 
engage with the concept of community outside nation state formations, may be regarded as 
tacitly endorsing this state of affairs by its refusal to address it.  So far as intangible cultural 
artefacts and practices are concerned, Western law is perhaps even more deeply implicated.  
The concept of private ownership of such artefacts and practices, developed into a system of 
commodification through the Western concept of intellectual property, means that their value 
is expressed only through the market thus severing them from their communities and destroying 
their character as heritage. 
When it comes to the question of the destruction of heritage the West really has been best at it 
– and for quite a long time.  But why be so strident on this point?  The answer to this is also a 
very simple one.  When we talk about the destruction of cultural heritage today, there is a 
tendency in at least some parts of the discourse to identify this as an East/West, us and them, 
phenomenon.  The famous cases of the Taliban dynamiting of the sixth century Buddhas of 
Bamiyan, the extensive destruction of archeological sites in Syria, especially but not only in 
Palmyra, are often analysed in these terms.  By thinking of the destruction of cultural heritage 
in this way we, of course, betray the Western obsession with monumentality and tangibility, 
which has been nurtured at the expense of a concept of cultural heritage as “a constitutive social 
process”.77  However, if heritage is understood as being such a process – and not just as a 
collection of static material artefacts - then Western responsibility for its destruction, and not 
only in the post-colonial world, is breath taking.  What is needed, I suggest, is a different 
discourse about the destruction of cultural heritage that acknowledges responsibility across the 
international board and looks for a solution in the light of that responsibility. 
                                                          
77 Smith 2006, n 12 above, at 82; & see text acc nn 29 & 40 above. 
